Political Incentives and Legislative Voting*

1. - Introduction

In many models of legislative behavior, legislators are pushed by competitive forces to pursue their constituents' interests. Downs [1957] showed how political competition forced legislators to follow a vote-maximizing strategy to be reelected, and models of special interest politics [WEINGAST, SHEPSLE, and JOHNSEN, 1981; HOLCOMBE, 1985] are built on the idea that legislators cater to special interests in order to maximize their political support. While these competitive pressures are undoubtedly important, other writers have pointed out that incumbents have erected barriers to entry that give some monopoly power to incumbent legislators. This monopoly power gives legislators the ability to incorporate their own personal preferences into their voting calculus. Models of legislative shirking [LOTT and REED, 1989; VANBEEK, 1991; KALT and ZUPAN, 1990] provide insights into time dependent and legislator specific differences in legislative shirking. This paper extends those ideas to develop a model which more explicitly states the legislator's voting calculus on a particular legislative vote.

This enables the identification of variables which a legislator must weigh in

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the decision to shirk and explains why his shirking behavior may differ across votes, and why the level of shirking may differ across legislatures.

The basic idea of shirking is straightforward: on some issues the legislator's own personal interest will differ from the interests of the legislator's constituents. In those cases, the legislator must weigh the expected net benefits of voting the constituents' interests against the personal net benefits the legislator could receive. One could imagine any number of issues on which the legislator could cast a vote opposing his constituents' interests that would reduce the probability of the legislator being reelected, but could enhance the legislator's wealth, job opportunities after leaving office, or provide other personal benefits. The legislator would have to weigh the relevant costs and benefits when deciding how to vote. This paper develops a more formal model of the legislator's decision-making calculus, which has a number of interesting implications for legislative shirking.

2. The model

Because any legislator currently in office has the option of resigning, revealed preference suggests that the legislator receives greater utility from holding office than he would receive if not in office. The implication is that the legislator would suffer a net loss in utility if he failed to be reelected. This net loss would be the difference in utility between being a legislator and accepting the next best alternative employment. Thus, it is easy to see that a legislator might vote in such a way as to lower his probability of reelection, if at the same time the vote enhanced the value of the alternative to being a legislator or other factors that would increase his utility in a more than compensating manner. The legislator will take into account all costs and benefits when deciding how to vote on an issue.

This idea can be developed more formally in a simple model. Let \( V_{pi} \) for \( i = 1, 2, ..., N \) be the probability that legislator \( i \) votes in favor of an issue, where \( N \) is the number of members in the legislative body, and \( V_{pi} \in [0, 1] \). Define \( P_{ai}(V_{p1}, V_{p2}, ..., V_{pn}) \) as legislator \( i \)'s subjective probability that the issue passes given his estimates of the other legislator's votes, \( V_{pj} \) where \( j = 1, 2, ..., i-1, i+1, ..., N \). Let \( P_{ai}(V_{p1}, V_{p2}) \) be continuously differentiable for each \( V_{pi} \in [0, 1] \). Define \( V_{ai} \) as legislator \( i \)'s expectation of the number of his constituents who support his reelection prior to his vote on the issue, and define \( CV_{ai}(V_{pi}) \) as legislator \( i \)'s expected change in constituents' votes for his reelection due to his vote on the issue rather than the outcome of the issue. The assumption that voters evaluate their legislator based upon his voting record, rather than legislative outcomes, is substantiated empirically by Banaian and Luksetich [1991] \(^2\). Let \( CV_{ai}(V_{pi}) \) be continuously differentiable for each

\(^2\) They find that legislators are rewarded at the polls for voting consistent with the preferences of the median voter.
Define $P_i(V_{ci}, CV_{ci})$ as legislator $i$'s expected probability of reelection, where $P_i(\cdot, CV_{ci})$ is continuously differentiable. Define $M_i(P_{ci})$ as the vector of legislator $i$'s real incomes of which some components are dependent upon the outcome of the issue, where $M_i(P_{ci})$ is continuously differentiable for each $P_{ci} \in [0,1]$. The income vector $M_i$ can be divided into three distinct subvectors: $M_{ii}$ is a vector of incomes relevant only to his legislative employment, $M_{zi}$ only to his alternative employment, and $M_{ii}$ is independent of his choice of employment. Let $\beta_i$ be legislator $i$'s discount factor, and $U_i(\beta_i, M_i)$ be legislator is indirect present valued utility function, where $U_i(\cdot, M_i)$ is continuously differentiable, and $\beta_i \in [0,1]$. The legislator will maximize the present value of his expected utility with respect to his vote on the issue.

\[
\max_{V_{ci}} \{ P_i[V_{ci}, CV_{ci}(V_{pi})] \cdot \{ U_i(\beta_i, M_{ii}(P_{ci}), M_{zi}(P_{ci}), M_{ii}(P_{ci})) \} \\
+ (1 - P_i)[V_{ci}, CV_{ci}(V_{pi})] \cdot \{ U_i(\beta_i, M_{zi}(P_{ci}), M_{ii}(P_{ci})) \} \}
\]

(1)

Differentiating with respect to $V_{pi}$ and letting:

\[
U_{ci} = U_i(\beta_i, M_{ii}(P_{ci}), M_{zi}(P_{ci})), \\
U_{zi} = U_i(\beta_i, M_{zi}(P_{ci}), M_{ii}(P_{ci})), \text{ and } P_{ci} = P_{ci}[V_{ci}, CV_{ci}(V_{pi})]
\]

yields the following first order condition:

\[
\left[ \frac{\partial P_{ci}}{\partial CV_{ci}} \right] [U_{ci} - U_{zi}] + \frac{\partial P_{ci}}{\partial V_{ci}} \left[ P_{ci} \left[ \frac{\partial U_{ci}}{\partial M_{ii}} \frac{\partial M_{ii}}{\partial P_{ci}} - \frac{\partial U_{zi}}{\partial M_{ii}} \frac{\partial M_{zi}}{\partial P_{ci}} \right] \\
+ P_{ci} \left[ \frac{\partial U_{zi}}{\partial M_{zi}} \frac{\partial M_{zi}}{\partial P_{ci}} \right] \right] + (1 - P_{ci}) \left[ \frac{\partial U_{zi}}{\partial M_{zi}} \frac{\partial M_{zi}}{\partial P_{ci}} \right] = 0
\]

(2)

Note that $\partial P_{ci}/\partial V_{pi}$ is the change in the outcome of the issue with respect to legislator $i$'s vote. This may be interpreted as the probability that his vote will decide the outcome of the vote on the issue (denoted $P_{ci}$) where $P_{ci} \in [0,1]$.

Let $\frac{\partial U_{ci}}{\partial M_{ii}} \frac{\partial M_{ii}}{\partial P_{ci}} = MU_{ci}^{(ii)}$ and $[U_{ci} - U_{zi}] = NU_{ci}$

where $NU_{ci}$ is the net utility from holding office mentioned at the beginning of this section and is positive.

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3 This term would also include the expected income stream from expected future political advancement opportunities.
After substitution, the first order condition becomes:

\[
\left[ \frac{\partial P_i}{\partial CV_i} - \frac{\partial CV_i}{\partial V_{pi}} \right] [NUO_i] + P_{ni}\{P_{ni}[MU_{m}^{M}] - MU_{n}^{M} \} + (1-P_{ni})MU_{n}^{M} = 0
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

if \( U_i \) is homothetic in \( M_{3i} \), such that,

\[
MU_{n}^{M} = MU_{m}^{M} = MU_{n}^{M}
\]

this may be reduced to:

\[
\left[ \frac{\partial P_i}{\partial CV_i} - \frac{\partial CV_i}{\partial V_{pi}} \right] [NUO_i] + P_{ni}\{P_{ni}[MU_{m}^{M}] + (1-P_{ni})MU_{n}^{M} \} = 0
\]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Note that \((\partial P_i/\partial CV_i) (\partial CV_i/\partial V_{pi})\) is the net marginal «political» cost or benefit. For ease, this will be denoted as \([MB_{pi} - MC_{pi}]\), where \(MB_{pi} (MC_{pi})\) is the marginal political benefit (cost). The expected net marginal utility terms will be denoted as \([MB_{ni} - MC_{ni}]\), where \(MB_{ni} (MC_{ni})\) is the marginal «personal» benefit (cost). Again rewriting:

\[
[MB_{pi} - MC_{pi}] [NUO_i] + P_{ni} [MB_{ni} - MC_{ni}] = 0
\]  \hspace{1cm} (5)

This first order condition shows that the legislator will equate the weighted net marginal personal benefits and the net marginal political benefits to determine the optimal probability of voting for an issue. If we define shirking as a situation when a legislator is less likely to vote for an issue because of his personal interests, then only in the case where \( P_{ni} = 0 \) will there be no shirking. When there are no personal benefits or costs involved in the voting decision then the second term falls out of the first order condition and the legislator will vote in the manner which maximizes his political support. Alternatively, if we define shirking as when a legislator votes in a manner which decreases the probability of reelection but increases his personal benefits, then we may use this first order condition to identify the variables which will make a legislator more likely to shirk.

3. - Implications

Clearly if there are both net marginal personal benefits and net marginal political benefits, his probability of voting for the policy will be one, and if there are both net marginal personal costs and net marginal political costs, the legislator’s probability of voting for the policy will be zero. The interesting case is when the legislator’s personal and political marginal incentives are different. His decision will be made by weighing the personal versus the political marginal costs and benefits. The intriguing result in this model is the
weights placed upon these factors in the legislator's first order condition. The legislator will weigh the personal costs and benefits by the probability that his vote will decide the outcome of the policy vote, and he will weigh the political costs and benefits by the net utility from holding office. Analyzing the legislator's voting behavior in this manner yields several interesting implications, all of which can easily be extended to special interest groups and their impact on legislative voting.

1) Ceteris paribus, the lower the net utility from holding political office, \( NUO_i = [U_{pol} - U_{own}] \), the less weight a legislator will give his constituents' interests relative to his own personal interests when voting on an issue before the legislature. Thus, benefits such as check-bouncing privileges, being allowed to run a tab at the legislative dining hall indefinitely, and other benefits which enhance the utility of holding office will cause legislators to decrease the weight they place on their own personal interests when they vote, thus lowering legislative shirking.

2) Ceteris paribus, a law that limits the number of terms a legislator may serve (thereby decreasing \( U_{pol} \), the present value of utility from holding office), will decrease the weight a legislator will give his constituents' interests relative to his own personal interests when voting on an issue before the legislature.

3) Ceteris paribus, the higher the probability that the legislator's vote will decide the outcome \( (P_{dv}) \), the more he will weigh his personal costs and benefits relative to his constituents' interests. Following the analysis of voting by Tollison, Crain, and Pautler [1975] and Barzel and Silberberg [1973], the legislator's ex ante probability that his vote will decide the outcome will be a function of two things: the number of voting members in the legislative body, \( N \), and the legislator's expectation of the other legislator's votes on the issue, \( V_j \) for \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, i-1, i+1, \ldots N \). The smaller the voting group, the more weight the legislator will give his personal costs and benefits relative to his constituents' preferences when voting on an issue before the legislature. Thus, for example, it should be expected that in general, members of the House of Representatives would weigh their personal interests less than members of the Senate because of the difference in the size of the bodies. Also, the smaller the expected margin of votes, the less weight he will give his constituent's interests relative to his own personal interests when voting on an issue before the legislature. The importance of this probability in political election voting has been widely discussed in the literature. Mueller [1989] estimates the probability of casting the decisive vote in a group of 100,000,000 voters at approximately 0.00006; however, in the average state legislature this probability, with no prior information about others' votes, is approximately

4 For example, see Downs [1957], Tullock [1967], and Riker and Ordeshook [1968, 1973].
10%. This probability becomes even larger in smaller bodies such as legislative committees, local school boards, and town councils.

For example, consider a vote on a legislative pay raise that is not supported by a legislator's constituents. If this legislator knew that the pay raise was going to fail, regardless of his vote, clearly his optimal vote would be against the pay raise. Alternatively, if the legislator knew that the pay raise was going to pass, regardless of his vote, his optimal vote would again be against the pay raise. However, if the legislator thought that his vote had a chance of being the decisive vote on the passage of the pay raise, he would then be more likely to vote in favor of the pay raise.

Thus legislative shirking will be more likely on votes where each legislator has a higher probability of casting the decisive vote. This will differ among votes in any given legislature because of differing expectations, and differ across legislatures because of legislative size.

4) Another intriguing insight can be found by a closer analysis of \( \partial P_i/\partial CV_o \), which is a component of the marginal political costs and benefits. From previous papers [PELTZMAN, 1976, 1984], the probability of reelection has been modeled as equal to the legislator's expected percent of the popular vote. Under that specification, this term is invariant to the level of prior political support, \( V_o \). Alternatively, it should be expected that a legislator who, prior to his policy vote, has a relatively larger constituent support percentage would be hurt less by an equal decrease in the number of constituents votes for his reelection (i.e. that \( \partial^2 P_i/\partial CV_o \cdot \partial V_o < 0 \)). The higher a legislator's winning percent of the popular vote in the last election, the less a given absolute change in constituent's support will affect his probability of reelection. So, ceteris paribus, the higher the prior political support, the less the legislator will weigh his constituent's interests relative to his own interests when voting on an issue before the legislature.

However, since the legislator's political support after his vote on an issue equals his prior political support relevant on the next issue, in a more dynamic voting model legislators should be expected to «spend their election margins» to attain personal benefits. The more risk averse the legislator, the less of his election margin he will spend, or lose, voting for issues that are more closely aligned with his personal interest.

5) A simple extension of this model is to include payments to legislators from special interest groups that are a direct function of the legislator's vote rather than the outcome of the issue.

These payments may take two forms, direct payments and offers of post-

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5 The actual formula for computing this probability is:

\[
\frac{(N-1)!}{2^{N-1} \cdot ([5(N-1)]^2}
\]

6 As noted in Parker [1989].
legislative employment. In this case both $M_{sl}$ and $M_{si}$ become functions of $\hat{\theta}_{\hat{\beta}}$, as well as, $P_{e}(V_{\hat{\beta}})$. The problem then becomes, with a first order condition of:

$$\max_{V_{\hat{\beta}}}
\begin{bmatrix}
p_{e}[V_{\hat{\beta}}, CV_{e}(V_{\hat{\beta}})] \\
+ (1-P_{e}[V_{\hat{\beta}}, CV_{e}(V_{\hat{\beta}})]) \cdot \{U_{i}[\beta_{i}, M_{s}[P_{e}(V_{\hat{\beta}}), V_{\hat{\beta}}])]
\end{bmatrix}$$

$$\{U_{i}[\beta_{i}, M_{s}[P_{e}(V_{\hat{\beta}}), V_{\hat{\beta}}])]
+ [1-P_{e}[V_{\hat{\beta}}, CV_{e}(V_{\hat{\beta}})]) \cdot \{U_{i}[\beta_{i}, M_{s}[P_{e}(V_{\hat{\beta}}), V_{\hat{\beta}}])
\}$$

$$\left[ \frac{\partial P_{e} \partial CV_{e}}{\partial CV_{e} \partial V_{\hat{\beta}}} \right]^T \{NUO\} + P_{e} \{P_{e} \cdot MU_{e}^{M1} + (1-P_{e})MU_{e}^{M2} + MU_{e}^{M3} \}$$

$$\frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial M_{e}} \frac{\partial M_{s}}{\partial V_{\hat{\beta}}} + (1-P_{e}) \left[ \frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial M_{s}} \frac{\partial M_{s}}{\partial V_{\hat{\beta}}} \right] = 0$$

where the next to last term is the direct payment and the last term, weighted by $(1-P_{e})$ is the post-legislative employment offer.

Note that for the results of the vote maximization model to hold, all three of the last terms must be zero.

An interesting implication of this extension is that since post-legislative employment offers are weighted by $(1-P_{e})$, direct payments will be weighted more heavily in the legislator’s decision making calculus than equal monetary offers in terms of post-legislative employment. In other words, a lobbyist must offer a relatively larger post-legislative employment opportunity to have the same influence on a legislator’s vote of a direct payment. Another implication of this analysis is that legislators who have relatively smaller subjective probabilities of reelection will value post-legislative employment offers more than legislators who have relatively higher subjective probabilities of reelection.

Thus legislators will be willing to trade off between constituent support, personal benefits and costs (that are results of the outcome), and lobbyist payments to maximize their expected utility.

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Empirical test and results

Perhaps the strongest empirical test of the model would be a cross sectional time series comparison of House versus Senate votes on a clearly defined issue related to the legislators’ interests. But the lack of roll call voting on these types of issues at a national level and the problems of structural differences or finding comparable issues across state legislatures hinders the data collection necessary to perform these empirical tests. A viable alternative is to use legislative turnover rates as a dependent variable to be explained by actors in the model presented earlier. Higher turnover can be used as an indicator that on average legislators are not representing their constituents’ interests as well as would be the case if turnover were lower.
The natural log of the turnover rate in state legislative bodies (LTURN) is chosen for the dependent variable as a proxy for a legislatures' members consistency with the preferences of their constituents. The turnover rate for a state legislative body is equal to the number of membership changes as a share of the number of seats up for election. Total changes include those who retire and those who lose in the elections. No adjustment was made in light of the fact that a legislator may prefer to choose retirement over an impending election loss, as was so obviously the case in the U.S. House of Representatives as a result of the house banking scandal in 1992. The choice of legislative turnover as the proxy for testing the implications presented in this paper inhibits the ability to test the impact of lobbyist payments and winning election margin size on legislative voting. A legislative body that has a higher average election margin should be expected to vote less consistently with the interests of their constituents; however, this does not necessarily imply that they will have higher turnover rates. It is likely that bodies with high average election margins will have lower turnover rates despite the fact that some of the margins will be spent over time.

Two independent variables are included to proxy the average probability that a legislator's vote would decide the outcome of issues up for vote in his legislature. The first measure of this probability (PROB) is the reciprocal of the total number of members in the legislative body. According to the model, a positive sign on the coefficient for this variable should be expected because average shirking, and thus turnover, will be higher in legislatures where the probability of casting the decisive vote is high. The natural log of the percent of the members belonging to the majority party (LMAR), in the year prior to the election, is used to approximate the average expected margin of votes on issues that came before the legislature. A negative coefficient on this variable should be expected.

Legislative salary, in thousands of constant dollars, corrected for cost of living differentials across states (RSAL), is used as a proxy for the utility from holding office, and a negative sign on the coefficient for this variable should be expected. Henceforth all data in constant dollars and deflated by the cost of living index will be termed real. At the time of the elections used in the data set, there were no states which had limitations on legislative terms, and thus that implication could not be tested. State population per legislator in hundred thousands (PPL) as a measure of accountability and monitoring ease, and state real personal income per capita, in thousands, (RPCI) as a possible measure of the opportunity cost of holding office and constituency differences are added to the regression as control variables.

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7 A variable for other direct payments in dollars and dummy variables for paid living expenses, retirement benefits, and paid personal staff were originally included but were not significant and thus excluded from the final regressions. Their exclusion does not affect the final results.

8 Other independent variables tried in different specifications were: per capita real state government spending, length of legislative session, the size of the other state legislative body, and
Data were collected for the 1980, 1984, and 1988 elections from various sources of both the Book of States and the Statistical Abstract of the United States.

The cost of living index was obtained from McMahon and Chang [1991] and the CPI obtained from the Economic Report of the President was used.

Table 1 - The Influence of Political Variables on Legislative Turnover

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient Estimate (t statistic)</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Pooled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.87062 (-1.73236</td>
<td>-0.669722</td>
<td>-1.28703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROB</td>
<td>9.36831 (2.21)</td>
<td>14.3858 (2.888)</td>
<td>14.3154 (2.897)</td>
<td>13.5504 (4.987)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>-0.28842 (1.129)</td>
<td>-0.413736 (1.227)</td>
<td>-0.337926 (0.964)</td>
<td>-0.351015 (1.946)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAL</td>
<td>-0.0147606 (2.124)</td>
<td>-0.0111941 (1.884)</td>
<td>-0.0114448 (2.327)</td>
<td>-0.0115613 (3.419)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPCI</td>
<td>-0.0145441 (0.850)</td>
<td>-0.0129405 (0.236)</td>
<td>-0.0731198 (1.979)</td>
<td>-0.0214679 (0.809)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*PL</td>
<td>0.0466446 (0.859)</td>
<td>-0.147633 (2.711)</td>
<td>-0.0148675 (0.281)</td>
<td>-0.0481461 (1.550)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*84</td>
<td>-0.0717617 (1.011)</td>
<td>-0.230604 (2.746)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*88</td>
<td>-0.230604 (2.746)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

&n bills introduced during the session prior to the election. Their exclusion does not affect the final results, suggesting that the model is robust with different specifications.

* The following were omitted because of the absence of elections or because of incomplete data: 1988 upper houses: AL, MD, MI, MN, MS, NE (unicameral), NJ, VA, WI; 1988 lower houses: AL, MD, MS, WI; 1984 upper houses: AL, ID, KY, LA, ME, MD, MI, MN, MS, ME, NJ, VA; 1984 lower houses: AL, ID, LA, MD, MS, NJ, VA; 1980 upper houses: AL, A, MD, MI, MS, NE, NM, VA; 1980 lower houses: AL, LA, MD, MS.
to convert legislative salaries to constant dollars. Ordinary least squares regressions were performed on each year's data separately and on the pooled data set. An F test was performed to determine whether the separate regressions have equal intercepts and equal slopes. The F statistic for this test is $F_{12,235} = 1.805$, which is rejected at the 5% level. The F statistic for the test of equal slopes is $F_{10,235} = 1.378$, which is not rejected at the 5% level. Thus it can be concluded that it is the intercepts which are statistically different.

To provide for the differing intercepts, dummy variables for 1984 data (Y84) and 1988 data (Y88) were included in the final regression on the pooled data set. Table 1 summarizes the results of the separate and pooled regressions.

The results from the pooled regression are used in the following analysis. The coefficient for PROB, which is the probability of casting the decisive vote, is positive as expected.

Using mean body size (76.96442), a 10 member increase in the body size causes a 2.29 percent decrease in the turnover rate through lowering the probability of casting the decisive vote. The coefficient on LMAR is negative as expected. A 10% increase in the percent of members belonging to the majority party produces a 3.5 percent decrease in the turnover rate of a legislative body. The coefficient on RSAL is negative as expected. A one-thousand dollar decrease in legislative salary produces a 1.16 percent increase in the turnover rate of a legislative body.

Both of the control variables are insignificant at the 10% level in the pooled regression, but the reader may interpret their coefficients in the same manner as above. However the sign of the coefficient on PPL, population per legislator, deserves a mention because for any given constituent base the members in a smaller legislative body will represent a larger number of people. The pooled regression would suggest that, ceteris paribus, as the population per legislator increases, the turnover rate for the legislative body decreases. This indicates that the higher rate of turnover in senates relative to houses is not due to the larger number of constituents per legislator in the senates. In fact, the impact of this difference in PPL is to offset the divergence in turnover rates caused by other variables. Another interesting fact can be concluded from analysis of the coefficients on the dummy variables for 1984 and 1988. Turnover rates have been decreasing throughout the 1980s and are 6.9% lower in 1984 than in 1980, and 20.6% lower in 1988 than in 1980, ceteris paribus. The high turnover rate in the 1980 elections could be attributable to the change of political party in the presidential office during that year's election.

5. Conclusions

The above empirical results offer limited evidence in support of the idea that legislative shirking will depend upon the legislator's subjective probability of casting the decisive vote. While other papers point out that shirking will
ffer across time periods and across legislators, this paper suggests that it ill also differ across votes within a legislature and across legislatures for iden-
tial legislators.

The theoretical model presented in this paper provides a consistent method
analyzing many facets of observed legislative phenomena, including factors
that contribute to legislators rationally choosing to vote in ways which may
lead to their failure to be reelected.

The outcomes of almost every issue voted on by a legislature will personally
affect the legislators involved in the voting process through either their tax-
abilities, the prices of products they consume, governmental benefits which
may accrue to them, or payments from special interest groups. This model
incorporates the constituent interest model of legislative behavior into the
sic utility maximization model which has proven so useful in other areas
of economic analysis to yield greater insight into legislative shirking. The em-
tirical results suggest that this type of model is descriptive of the way in
which legislators make their voting decisions, and that personal interests as
well as political interests are important at the margin when legislators decide
how to vote on issues that come before the legislature.

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