Institutions, Entrepreneurship, and Regional Differences in Economic Growth

by Joshua C. Hall* & Russell S. Sobel**

Abstract

This paper takes an institutional approach to explaining differences in the levels of entrepreneurship and economic growth across U.S. states. The institutional approach to growth argues that political and economic institutions influence the productivity of resource use. We hypothesize that institutions influence economic growth primarily through their effect on entrepreneurship and discovery. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that institutional quality is a determinant of regional differences in entrepreneurship and economic growth using data from the Economic Freedom of North America index to measure institutional quality.

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Introduction

The question of why some areas are rich and some are poor has been at the center of economics since Adam Smith ([1776] 1998) first published his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. In his analysis, Smith focused the division of labor and how the division of labor was limited by the size (or ‘extent’ as he termed it) of the market. Larger markets lead to an increase in the division of labor and thus higher productivity. Higher productivity, in turn, leads to economic progress directly by increasing wages and indirectly through freeing up scarce resources for other uses.

Ricardo (1817), however, focused attention back on the role that inputs such as land, labor, and capital played in economic growth. The creation of macroeconomic statistics in the early twentieth century led economists to focus on aggregate theories of growth that could explain this newly developed macroeconomic data. Solow (1956) developed a simple growth model where economic output was simply a mathematical function of capital and labor inputs \([Y = f(K,L)]\) based on neoclassical theory that, when tested empirically, fit the available U.S. data quite well. The Solow model was the dominant theory of economic growth from the time of its creation until the 1980s and is still heavily used in many graduate macroeconomics classes. While this model has been augmented to sometimes include measures of technology and human capital quality, it fundamentally ignores the institutional arguments made by Adam Smith. In the Solow growth model, these complex institutional structures are simply represented by the functional form of the model, \(f(\cdot)\).

During the 1980s new data sets were created that contained macroeconomic data on a large number of countries over an extended period of time (see, for example, Summers and Heston (1991)). The creation of these data sets allowed
economists for the first time to test whether per-capita incomes across countries were converging to equality—a key prediction of the neoclassical growth model (Romer, 1994). Subsequent research on the question of convergence has shown that there is no clear tendency for poor regions to grow faster than wealthier regions (Romer, 1994) although some research does show that regions within a country do converge, albeit slowly (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Holtz-Eakin, 1993). At best, convergence is a slow and discontinuous process (Martin and Sunley, 1998). The finding that convergence sometimes happens slowly within a country (or a set of similar countries) has led to the idea of conditional convergence, where convergence happens conditional on regions having similar properties.

The failure to find convergence in cross-country regressions was problematic since the Solow model was the model of economic growth at the time and had a strong influence on public policy. It could not, however, explain key features of the real world, such as persistent differences in income levels across countries. Neoclassical growth theory could also not explain the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth since the level of innovation was determined exogenous to the system. Even models like Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1992) that relax the neoclassical assumption of uniform technology across space have no explanation for why technological innovation might vary from place to place. Out of this disenchantment came endogenous growth theory, which relaxed the neoclassical assumption of exogenous technological change and the non-excludability of technology.

Unfortunately, endogenous growth theory cannot explain divergent levels of income across countries or the rapid development of countries like South Korea (Parente, 2001). From the standpoint of public policy, the failure of endogenous growth models to provide an explanation for varying levels of economic development is troubling because the sources of growth in endogenous growth models (such as the percentage of
GDP spent on research and development) may not be the route
to development. While endogenous growth models make
innovation endogenous they say little about how and why firms
and individuals appear to generate, absorb, and apply
innovations at different rates across regions even holding
constant investment in research and development (Martin and
Sunley, 1998).

The omission of entrepreneurship and discovery from
the standard models of economics is widely recognized, and we
argue that its omission from growth theory is even more critical.
Missing from the endogenous growth literature is why the
ability of individuals and firms to adapt and innovate varies
across space. In other words, what changes across space that
causes the ability of individuals to learn and innovate in a
socially-productive manner? This study takes an institutional
approach to explaining differences in entrepreneurship and
income levels and growth rates across regions. We argue that
what is missing in the endogenous growth literature is a focus
on how economic institutions affect entrepreneurship and
innovation within a society. In doing so, we open up the ‘black
box’ of innovation to explain why some societies are able to
generate increasing returns given certain inputs and others
cannot. Our contention is that only by explaining why
innovation and entrepreneurship vary across space can we
understand why regions have persistent differences in income
and growth, and why convergence does not occur as the
standard growth models predict. Institutional path-dependence
and the difficult process of institutional change help to explain
the persistence of regional differences in income and growth.

In this paper, we discuss the critical role of institutions
for economic growth and postulate that the key linkage between
the two occurs through entrepreneurship. We review the
empirical evidence on this issue, and provide new evidence
from the latest index of entrepreneurial activity for the U.S.
states, the Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity (KIEA)
(Fairlie, 2006a). Specifically, we use the Economic Freedom of
North America (EFNA) index (Karabegovic and McMahon, 2006) as a measure of institutional quality to examine the effect of institutions on cross-state differences in entrepreneurship, income, and economic growth. The results presented here confirm that institutions consistent with free-market capitalism, or ‘economic freedom,’ lead to higher levels of productive entrepreneurial activity, which in turn generate higher per capita income levels and higher rates of economic growth. This finding is important because, in contrast to traditional growth models, it suggests that places with better institutional structures will be richer and grow faster, creating a widening gap between rich and poor areas.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section places the neoclassical/endogenous growth debate in the context of the regional economic development literature. In section 3 we explain the institutional approach to growth and describe the role of the entrepreneur in translating good institutions into economic development. Section 4 describes our data while Section 5 presents our empirical results. Our final section concludes with discussion of the results and some thoughts on the future of research into institutions, entrepreneurship and economic growth.

**Literature Review**

*Two Theories of Regional Economic Growth*

In recent years, the economics literature has offered two different perspectives on divergent levels of growth across regions. The first perspective on regional economic growth is rooted in mainstream neoclassical equilibrium and is best identified in the regional literature with the work of Borts (1960) and Borts and Stein (1964). The second perspective takes a disequilibrium approach and is based on the work of Kaldor (1970). Within the literature the presumption is that these two are distinct. Here we argue that the disequilibrium
The neoclassical perspective on long-run economic development is driven by its focus on equilibrium. Regional differences in factors such as wages, prices, or the return to capital, from a neoclassical perspective, represent disequilibrium. In the long run, these regional differences should largely disappear as the mobility of labor and capital bring about the elimination of regional differences in income. In the long run, for example, labor in low-wage regions should flow to high-wage regions resulting in falling wages in high-wage regions and the raising of wages in low-wage regions. Capital, on the other hand, should be observed flowing from high-wage regions to low-wage regions. Thus the neoclassical model predicts that in the long run, if key resources are mobile, regional incomes should converge.

However, human activity is not uniform across space. Native factors such as topography and natural resource endowments play a large role in the concentration of individuals and resources (Cushing, 1987). The city of Pittsburgh, for example, came into existence because of its proximity to three major waterways. Ellison and Glaeser (1999) point out how the concentration of the U.S. wine industry in California is due to climatic factors that give the region a natural cost advantage. The same is true of industries based on natural resource endowments, such as the coal industry in West Virginia. While natural resource endowments can in part determine the growth path of an economy if the incentive to invest in research and development is reduced because of the presence of endowments, the ability to trade for new technology means that consumption is almost certainly higher because of the endowments than it would be without (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Fixed factors thus contribute to regional divergence through their effects on agglomeration and investment in innovation.
Even without geographically unique endowments, however, individuals have an incentive to concentrate in cities and regions to take advantage of the benefits from the agglomeration of individuals in space (Mulligan, 1984). There are three sources of external economies of scale that create agglomeration. The first force promoting geographic concentration is the backward and forward linkages that occur in large markets. Local production of intermediate goods lowers production costs for firms and the closeness of consumers lowers shipping costs. Second, the thick labor markets created by the large number of geographically concentrated individuals are beneficial both to firms and workers. Firms benefit from having easy access to employees with specialized skill and employees find it easier to find employment. The third force promoting concentration is the effect of pure external economies of scale—knowledge spillovers. The confluence of individuals into a small geographic space makes the diffusion of innovation almost costless and increases the opportunity for innovation as individuals are exposed to different industries. Krugman (1998) calls these forces ‘centripetal forces’ because they are the three forces that promote geographic concentration.

Just as there are forces promoting the clustering of individuals and firms in space, there are forces pushing them apart. Krugman (1998) terms these ‘centrifugal forces’ and gives three main types. First, immobile factors such as natural resources endowments prevent extreme agglomeration since firms and workers must locate in close proximity to the endowments. Second, the geographic concentration of individuals in space drives up the demand for land in large markets, increasing land rents and discouraging further migration to the area on the margin. Third, an increasing concentration of individuals in a geographic area can lead to pure external diseconomies of scale such as air pollution or congestion. All three of these factors mitigate, to some extent, the centripetal forces mentioned earlier.
The presence of immobile factors and centripetal forces is important because they provide a strong case why we might not see a convergence in incomes and wealth across space as predicted by the neoclassical model. If the concentration of individuals into cities generates pure external economies of scale that are not completely offset by pure diseconomies of scale, densely-populated areas should have higher incomes than sparsely-populated areas other things being equal. Or if there are location-specific amenities valued by households, some areas may retain high wages to compensate households for the lack of location-specific amenities such as in the models of Mueser and Graves (1995). History, geography, and luck all point towards there being some level of divergence in incomes across space that is persistent.

That does not imply that we should not observe some convergence across regions. The equilibrium forces at work in the neoclassical model are still present in the disequilibrium model and thus we should see some convergence over time as knowledge becomes diffused over space. At the same time, however, the urbanization economies at work in high-income regions beget more entrepreneurship and innovation, spurring high-income areas ahead until knowledge can diffuse and factors become mobile. Here we are arguing that the innovation caused by urbanization economies causes a divergence-convergence cycle. A new innovation happens because of urbanization economies giving some initial benefit to the urban area. Over time, those innovations become diffused over space and the centrifugal forces such as higher land rents lead to convergence. This argument is consistent with the empirical literature on convergence showing that convergence is a discontinuous process filled with starts and stops. A discontinuous process of convergence is consistent with the chaotic and random process of entrepreneurship and innovation occurring more frequently in highly agglomerated areas.
Having established that uninterrupted market forces can cause divergence in growth and incomes across regions, we now turn our attention to the role of institutions. According to North (1991, 97), “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.” Institutions can be either formal, as in the U.S. Constitution, or informal, as in customs or beliefs. Individuals find it necessary to devise institutions to set constraints on market interaction in order to maximize the gains from exchange. Market transactions and exchange depend on cooperation and trust, which is lacking in one-shot settings or in cases of asymmetrical or incomplete information. In these cases the transactions costs to widespread exchange are high. While exchange is possible, considerable resources are necessary to overcome the lack of trust.

By reducing uncertainty and making clear the rules of the game, institutions lower transactions costs. The lowering of transactions costs not only makes certain exchanges more profitable, but it increases the number of potential exchanges because in the presence of low transactions costs previously unprofitable exchanges are now profitable. Formal institutions help individuals capture the gains from trade by making it possible for widespread exchange to occur with low transactions costs. For example, knowing that a potential transaction is occurring in a system of well-defined and protected property rights facilitates the type of widespread economic exchange characterized by online auction sites such as eBay. By reducing transactions costs and allowing individuals to capture the gains from exchange, institutions increase the production possibilities of an economy (Boettke and Coyne, 2003). Thus, in contrast to the neoclassical model’s prediction, the institutional model’s prediction is that two locations with identical geographical features, demographics,
and the same level of inputs (or resources) can have wildly different economic outcomes because of different institutional structures.

The economic development literature has recently begun to recognize the importance of institutions. There is a growing theoretical and empirical literature on the importance of institutional quality in explaining cross-country differences in growth (North, 1990; Dawson, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999; Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson, 2004). While each of these papers measures institutions in a slightly different way, they all find evidence that countries with better institutions have higher levels and rates of growth than countries with poor economic institutions.\textsuperscript{12}

Missing in these papers, however, is the mechanism through which institutions lead to higher economic growth. What is the process through which institutional differences lead to differences in income and growth? For instance, does protection of property rights merely result in fewer resources being devoted to protection from theft? Or does a reduced risk of expropriation create an environment in which positive-sum entrepreneurship flourishes? Or is it some combination of the two? While some studies have tried to parcel out which parts of economic freedom are most important to economic growth (most notably, Heckelman and Stroup (2000)), these studies do not address the mechanism through which institutions lead to economic growth. Instead, they generally try to explain which parts of economic freedom (such as property rights or legal structure) are most important. How can institutional differences lead to the increasing returns necessary to explain persistent cross-sectional differences in income and growth?

In this paper we propose that institutions lead to entrepreneurship which begets economic growth. Since the quality of institutions differs across regions and is quite persistent over time, this provides an explanation for the discontinuous nature of regional convergence and divergence. Areas with good economic institutions are able to continually
‘jump ahead’ of places with poor institutions because good institutions lead to entrepreneurship and innovation. Kreft and Sobel (2005) find that states with more economic freedom have higher levels of entrepreneurship and economic growth while Campbell and Rodgers (2007) find a strong positive relationship between economic freedom and net business formation. This research provides the first evidence that the conduit between economic freedom and economic growth is through entrepreneurship and it is this literature that we seek to expand upon.

Our hypothesis brings together three distinct lines of literature into one explanation for regional differences in income and growth. The first explanation, as discussed earlier, is the body of research linking institutions to growth. Second, the endogenous growth literature links innovation to economic growth. Finally, there is a recent body of literature empirically linking entrepreneurship to economic growth (Zacharakis, Bygrave, and Shepherd, 2000; Ovaska and Sobel, 2005; Berkowitz and DeJong, 2005). Our thesis, which brings together these three strains of literature, is that the economic institutions of a region determine, to a large extent, where entrepreneurship and innovation will occur and thus which regions will see strong and persistent bouts of economic growth.

Our argument relies on Baumol’s (1990) distinction between ‘productive and unproductive entrepreneurship.’ Contrary to those who suggest that regional differences in entrepreneurship can be explained by regional differences in ‘entrepreneurial spirit,’ Baumol argues that there is little evidence that entrepreneurial spirit differs across regions. Instead, regional differences in entrepreneurship are the result of different institutional arrangements across regions. In regions where payoff to self-employment is high, we should observe more self-employment. In regions where the expected payoff to self-employment is low, perhaps because of taxation, we should observe lower rates of self-employment.
The key insight of Baumol is that entrepreneurial efforts are directed towards the exploitation of all recognized profit opportunities. Entrepreneurship is the recognition of a pure profit opportunity that had previously gone unnoticed (Kirzner, 1997). Recognition of profit opportunities is unique to time and space, however, and thus the allocation of talent within a society is important to future innovation because it places individuals into situations with different societal payoffs. In regions with good institutions, creative individuals are more likely to become employed in wealth-creating occupations such as engineering and thus are more likely to engage in wealth-creating entrepreneurship. Conversely, in regions with bad institutions, individuals will be attracted to activities that are personally remunerative but socially destructive such as lobbying and lawsuits. Good institutions help to foster an entrepreneurial climate conducive to innovation and growth.

Method

The measure of institutions we employ in this paper is the Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA) index released annually by the Fraser Institute. The EFNA index measures the extent of the restrictions that governments place on economic freedom within the U.S. states and Canadian provinces. At its core, the EFNA index is supposed to measure the extent to which citizens are free to acquire, use, and dispose of property so long as they do not violate the rights of other individuals (Karabegovic and McMahon, 2006). The three core components of the EFNA index are: size of government, takings and discriminatory taxation, and labor market freedom. The authors use data from government and non-government sources to assemble the index, which is constructed on a scale of zero to ten with ten being an extremely high level of economic freedom. Since the EFNA index compares states and provinces to one another, it is a relative ranking in that it does not tell how economically ‘free’ in an absolute sense Wyoming is, but
rather how ‘free’ Wyoming is compared to Connecticut in a
given year. The EFNA index is available annually going back to
1980.

The academic literature on institutions and
entrepreneurship has used several different measures of
entrepreneurship. Kreft and Sobel (2005) look at the impact of
economic freedom on the growth rate in sole proprietorships.
Ovaska and Sobel (2005) analyze the effect of economic
freedom on the growth rate of private enterprises and trademark
applications, while Campbell and Rodgers (2007) examine the
relationship between state economic freedom and net business
formation. Recently, the Kauffman Foundation set out to create
a new state-level measure of entrepreneurship, the Kauffman
Index of Entrepreneurial Activity. The KIEA uses the monthly
data files from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to create a
longitudinal data set of a representative sample of U.S. adults.
From that data set the number of non-business owning adults
(ages 20-64) who start a business each year is measured and
used to create the index.

The KIEA would appear to have two advantages over
previous used measures of entrepreneurship in the literature.
The first advantage of the KIEA is that it measures flows into
entrepreneurship rather than the stock of entrepreneurship. For
example, the number of sole proprietorships within a state is a
stock variable and thus reflects past economic activity as well as
current conditions. The KIEA index therefore appears to more
accurately capture dynamic entrepreneurial activity (Fairlie,
2006b). The second advantage of the KIEA follows from the
fact that it is based on the CPS and not derived from business
incorporation data or payroll records. Data derived from records
of incorporation or payroll records can often understate
entrepreneurial activity, since many business do not incorporate
or have zero employees. Including entrepreneurs who have no
employees is likely to be most important in measuring
entrepreneurship in high-technology areas. The main drawback
to the state-level KIEA at this point is that it is only available
for the years 2004 and 2005, thus limiting the empirical approach to a cross-sectional analysis.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition the KIEA and EFNA index, we also include several other control variables standard in the entrepreneurship literature (see, for example, Bruce (2002)). The percentage of state residents over 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree, the median age of the state population, the percentage of state residents that are Hispanic, and the percentage of state residents that are male are included as demographic controls. Socioeconomic controls are the state unemployment rate, state gross domestic product per capita, and population density.\textsuperscript{16} A description of these variable and their means and standard deviations are available in Table 1. Most policy variables that are often included in empirical studies of entrepreneurship (such as marginal income tax rates) cannot be included here because they are already included in the EFNA index. The one exception is the homestead exemption from state bankruptcy laws.

Since an entrepreneur’s home is in most cases their most valuable asset, the ability of potential entrepreneurs to shield their home and other assets from being liquidated during bankruptcy might affect their propensity to become an entrepreneur (Fan and White, 2003; Garrett and Wall, 2006). The level of exemption varies considerably by state due to state-level differences in how much of the homestead is exempted during bankruptcy. For example, in 1997 six states had no homestead exemption while eight states had an unlimited exemption (Garrett and Wall, 2006). The measure of the size of the homestead exemption we use comes from Garrett and Wall (2006) and measures the percentage of the average homestead in a state that would be protected during a bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{17}
Table 1. Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kauffman Index of Entr. Activity</td>
<td>-10.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-28.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Freedom</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% College Degree</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>193.0</td>
<td>261.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1175.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product Per Capita</td>
<td>$40,346</td>
<td>$7,184</td>
<td>$27,829</td>
<td>$66,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homestead Exemption</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homestead Exemption Squared</td>
<td>1505.0</td>
<td>1953.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5685.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between the size of the homestead exemption and entrepreneurship is likely non-linear in nature because the exemption has two different effects. The first, called the wealth-insurance effect, is positive because a higher homestead exemption limits the downside risk potential entrepreneurs face. The second effect, called the credit-access affect, is negative because banks are aware that their ability to recoup their losses during bankruptcy proceedings is limited by the homestead exemption and therefore limit the amount of credit they offer to fledgling entrepreneurs. To account for these opposing effects, we employ both the homestead exemption measure as well as the homestead exemption squared in the empirical section of the paper.
First, we begin by showing the general relationship between the EFNA index and economic prosperity that has been confirmed by previous research (Kreft and Sobel, 2005; Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson, 2004). Figure 1 illustrates the basic relationship between a state’s EFNA score and the levels of per capita income across the U.S. states. As is clear in the figure, institutional quality is positively correlated with the levels of per capita income. Thus states with greater economic freedom have higher levels of economic growth.

**Figure 1. Economic Freedom and Growth**

This relationship between economic freedom and the level of prosperity in a state is not by itself contradictory to a finding of
convergence. The equilibrium forces at work in the standard convergence model simply suggest that states will converge in income over time. Yet this is not happening. Quite simply put, states such as Delaware are high-income and are growing the fastest, while states like West Virginia are low-income and growing the slowest. Rather than converging, states are moving further apart. This is easiest to see in Figure 2, which shows the variance across states in real per capita personal income for the entire period for which such data exists (1929-2005). While there are cyclical patterns, the overall trend is definitely positive. The variance across states is growing, not shrinking.

Figure 2. The Variance in Real per Capita State Personal Income, 1929-2005

The remaining empirical question is whether there is a link between institutional quality and entrepreneurial activity as has been demonstrated previously by Kreft and Sobel (2005) and Campbell and Rodgers (2007). Figure 3 shows the raw positive correlation between the percentage point change in the KIEA index from 2004-2005 and the level of economic freedom.
in a state. It is important to note that all states had significant reductions in their scores over this time period, so the mean change is negative. Nonetheless, there is a clear relationship, the places whose scores fell by the most (e.g., those having the largest reductions in entrepreneurial activity) were those with the worst institutional quality.

**Figure 3. Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurship**

Could there be other factors that differ across states driving the results showing in Figure 3? To answer this question, we estimate an empirical model explaining the change in the KIEA from 2004-2005 using the explanatory variables discussed in the previous section. Table 2 presents our key results. In Column 1, we estimated the empirical model using ordinary least squares (OLS) and employing White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. The results in Column 1 confirm that
‘economic freedom’, as measured by the most-recent EFNA index score for a state, has positive and significant impact on the change in the rate of entrepreneurship as measured by the Kauffman entrepreneurship index. The relationship is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Calculated at the mean, the coefficient on economic freedom from Table 2 suggests that a one-unit change in the EFNA index would result in a 5.041 unit change in the dependent variable, or almost exactly two-thirds of a standard deviation (6.9).

In Column 2 and 3, we estimate the model using spatial econometric methods. These models are useful in situations where geographic (spatial) dependence exists in the data, which recent research has found to be the case with small business activity (Sobel and Dean, 2006). Spatial dependence exists when there are unobservable geographic correlations within either the dependent variable, or the regression error term, and this can render OLS to be either biased and inconsistent or inefficient. For readers unfamiliar with spatial econometrics, LeSage and Pace (2004) provides an overview. However one may simply think of spatial models as analogous to ARMA time series models, but with the lags occurring over geographic distances, rather than through time. We run both a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) of degree one, analogous to the AR(1) model in time series, and a spatial error model (SEM), analogous to an MA(1) process.

The SAR model has an additional parameter estimate, rho, which is the coefficient on the spatially lagged dependent variable. This variable measures the extent to which entrepreneurship in neighboring states influences entrepreneurship in a particular state. It is insignificant, suggesting that there is no direct spatial dependence. In the SEM model, the additional parameter, lambda, is the coefficient on the spatially lagged error term. It is significant, showing the presence of spatially dependence in the error term and implying that SEM results are likely the most accurate estimates in Table 2.
### Table 2. Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurship, Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>SAR</th>
<th>SEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>144.42</td>
<td>144.76</td>
<td>251.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.05)</td>
<td>(-1.08)</td>
<td>(-1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Freedom</td>
<td>5.041 **</td>
<td>5.058 **</td>
<td>5.879 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.17)</td>
<td>(-2.73)</td>
<td>(-2.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.28)</td>
<td>(-0.13)</td>
<td>(-0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% College Degree</td>
<td>0.442 *</td>
<td>0.44 *</td>
<td>0.455 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.89)</td>
<td>(-0.26)</td>
<td>(-0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.35)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.32)</td>
<td>(-2.8)</td>
<td>(-3.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>1.103 *</td>
<td>1.104 *</td>
<td>1.377 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.95)</td>
<td>(-0.81)</td>
<td>(-0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>1.305</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td>1.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.14)</td>
<td>(-1.23)</td>
<td>(-1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product Per Capita</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in thousands)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homestead Exemption</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>-0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.81)</td>
<td>(-0.24)</td>
<td>(-0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homestead Exemption Squared</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.03)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>(-0.21)</td>
<td>0.406 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambda</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *indicates significance at the 10 % level, **at the 5 % level, and *** at 1% level.

In Column 1, Absolute t-statistics in parentheses, in 2 & 3, posterior std. deviations.

OLS corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's correction.
While in the SAR model the coefficient on economic freedom remained significant and of about the same magnitude, in the SEM model correcting for the spatially dependent error structure increases the size of the coefficient on economic freedom.

In the first two columns, failing to correct for the spatially dependent error structure biased downward the estimates of the impact of economic freedom, median age, and the square of the homestead exemption, which is now larger and statistically significant. The negative sign on the homestead exemption variable is the result of the credit access effect, while the positive and significant sign on the homestead exemption squared is the result of the wealth insurance effect. Thus the homestead exemption actually reduces the rate of entrepreneurship until the wealth insurance effect begins to dominate. The larger coefficient on the EFNA term suggests that a one unit increase in a state’s EFNA index would increase that state’s score on the KIEA by 5.879 percentage points, other things equal. That is around 85 percent of a standard deviation increase in the change in a state’s KIEA score. More importantly, correcting for spatial dependence only strengthens the positive relationship between economic freedom and entrepreneurship at the state level. These results presented in table 2 confirm the previous research by Kreft and Sobel (2005) and Campbell and Rodgers (2007) showing that economic freedom has a positive and significant impact on measures of entrepreneurial activity, but using this new measure of state entrepreneurial activity.

**Conclusion**

The evidence presented here suggests that differences in institutional quality help to explain differences in entrepreneurship across states. Combined with other research showing that entrepreneurship leads to higher levels of economic growth, we argue that entrepreneurship is the mechanism through which institutions are translated into economic growth. This finding helps explain the evidence that
low-income regions converge towards high-income regions in a slow and discontinuous manner. The effect of institutions on entrepreneurial innovation make it the case that although capital and labor tend to move to where they are most valued, the higher levels of innovation in regions with good institutions disrupts the convergence and pushes areas with good institutions ahead again. The persistence of differences in institutional quality thus helps to explain the persistence of income and wealth differences across states.

While borrowing from the literature on endogenous growth, this paper differs in its policy implications. Endogenous growth theory takes knowledge production and hence, research and development spending, as the key to generating increasing returns. We argue that the results presented here shows that it is good institutions that allow research and development to be translated into economic growth. Good institutions simply better channel productive resources to their highest valued use. Thus state policymakers interested in improving economic growth in a state should focus on improving that state’s economic freedom, rather than trying to pursue policies to increase the quantity of economic inputs (subsidies for education, technology, venture capital, etc.). While institutions are persistent and thus effecting institutional change is difficult, recognition that institutions matter is an important first step in the process of promoting entrepreneurial activity—the root source of economic growth and prosperity.
References


Ellison, G., & E.Glaeser. (1999). The geographic concentration of industry: Does natural advantage explain


Endnotes

2 This review of the Bass model is based on that provided by Chandrasekaran and Tellis (2007).
4 Quoted from Bass (2004), p. 11. For other examples of research into the ability of the firm to influence the coefficients with price changes, or advertising expenditures see Mahajan, Muller and Bass (1990); Mesak and Clark (1998) and Easingwood, Mahajan and Muller (1983).
5 This time is \( \frac{1}{(p+q)} \ln\left( \frac{p}{q} \right) \). See Bass (1969), p. 218 and Majahan, Muller and Bass (1990), p. 5.
6 An estimate of “relative” earnings assumes \( M \), the market size in equation (7) is 1.
7 This is the only case where \( M \) was forced rather than determined experimentally and was necessary because the regression result produced an unrealistically large estimate for \( M \).
8 See Oracle’s historical timeline on its website: www.oracle.com.

9 Easterly (2001) provides an excellent discussion of how the Solow model influenced the policies advocated by the international development community.
10 Of course, in order for institutions to vary across space they have to vary over time. A state or country’s institutions are the product of history, and prolonged attention to ‘getting the policies right’ can have a large payoff in terms of institutional quality, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. Internationally, an excellent example of this is Ireland which went from being one of the poorest European countries to one of the most prosperous in less than a generation. Powell (2003) details how a series of policy changes begun in 1987 increased economic freedom in Ireland, leading to tremendous dynamism and high rates of economic growth in that country.
11 This is not to say that other factors are not important. Pure external economies of scale are surely important in generating regional differences in growth as is the location of important natural resources and topography. For example, New York City was poised to become a financial capital due to its status as a trans-shipment port in the early nineteenth century. While the regional economics literature has long acknowledged the importance of these factors in explaining regional differences in income and growth, our point is simply that the literature has generally ignored the influence of institutions.
on economic development despite a large literature showing that institutions matter.

12 The question of which measure of institutional quality is appropriate is a matter of considerable debate beyond the scope of this paper (see Glaeser et al., 2004 for an example of this debate). We employ the measures of economic freedom produced by the Fraser Institute because of their direct policy relevance, unlike other institutional measures (Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson, 2004).

13 Apart from its effect on entrepreneurship, institutions help to foster innovation. Green, Melnyk and Powers (2002) find that the greater the amount of economic freedom in a country, the greater the amount of technological diffusion as countries with poor institutions have weak incentives for individuals to adopt new technology.

14 Fairlie (2006b) cites U.S. Census Bureau data that only 23.6 percent of firms had employees in 2003.

15 The national KIEA (Fairlie, 2006b), which began the same year as the state-level index, was retroactively measured back to 1996. Unfortunately, this was not done for the state-level index. Whether this was because of technical limitations or for other reasons is unclear.

16 Unless otherwise noted, all variables are for calendar year 2005 and come from the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2007 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). State rankings are available online at: http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/rankings.html.

17 See Garrett and Wall (2006) for a more complete discussion of this variable and its calculation. Here we employ the value from 1998, the most recent year available from their study.

18 Like most measures of entrepreneurial activity that include measure of self-employment this index appears to suffer from the problem of giving scores that are too low to urbanized states with more job opportunities at big companies (such as Delaware), while giving scores that are too high to rural states with relatively low traditional job opportunities (like West Virginia). In part, this problem can be dealt with by controlling for population density and (for variables with more years) through state ‘fixed effects.’ To be sure that rural bias is not driving our results we examine the change over the two available years.

19 Note that all three empirical models exclude Alaska and Hawaii. This was done to maintain consistency across specifications, since Hawaii and Alaska have no neighbors and thus are generally excluded from spatial models.